Latour’s book “Science in Action” sparked much interest in the scientific community, cumulating in the so called “science war”. Most pronounced, he is criticized for his social constructivistic and relativistic perspective on knowledge production. In this workshop, we discussed whether these accusations hold true and, more fundamentally, whether it is not the very essence of Latour’s work to provide a new perspective on such distinctions like, for example, realism and relativism.

Key Finding 1: Knowledge Production
Knowledge is often defined as justified true beliefs. In “Science in Action”, Latour does not provide own definitions for knowledge, belief, and many other philosophical concepts. At first sight, this may appear as a lack of scientific rigor. But given his understanding of how scientific facts are produced, it is only consistent to refrain from providing definitions.

Central to his understanding of scientific knowledge production is the concept of translations. In his view, knowledge does not simply diffuse. Instead, science is constantly “in the making”; it is always transformed by the people involved according to their own interests. Every translation is a fundamentally creative act of re-creation. Thus, knowledge changes as it is passed on and translation processes become a source of innovation.

At the same time, these translations are problematic, each vulnerable to critique. Latour argues that the main mechanism to stabilize and immunize translations against critique is black boxing. There is no way to objectively rationalize a translation; they can always be challenged. Only if they have been turned into taken-for-granted facts, black boxes, critique falls silent.

One could argue that these translation problems are deficiencies to be overcome. Latour, instead, argues that they are essential for the creation of new scientific facts. Without problematic translations, knowledge claims would be even more challengeable. Every claim in the chain of arguments would become apparent and, thus, a subject to criticisms. Furthermore, much more fundamental epistemological concerns would arouse like, e.g., the problem of induction or infinite regress. Thus, Latour suggests that it is rather heterogeneity and imperfect translations which stabilize a knowledge claim than perfect common knowledge and perfect rationality. Consequentially, Latour “black boxes” concepts like knowledge and beliefs in his own writing. By providing definitions, he would have exposed the concepts to criticism.

Key Finding 2: Theory of Action vs. Theory of Actors
The strategy-as-practice literature often refers to Latour’s work. Does this imply that Latour proposes an alternative theory of action? And if so, given his focus on science, do his insights also hold for management?

We would rather argue that Latour describes action but does not advance a theory of action. Furthermore, as the label “actor network theories” implies, he is much more concerned about the actors involved in the production of science, be it human actors or artifacts, and their interaction than offering an alternative theory of action.

There are also some decisive differences between science and management: (1) As vividly described in the first chapters, science is much about producing texts. By contrast, managers rarely produce texts to describe and justify their positions but, instead, rely on oral communication. The managers’ rational behind this approach might be that a position confirmed in writing is much more vulnerable to critique than any position only put forward in oral communication. (2) According to Latour, all laboratories are essentially the same. By replicating prior experiments, all laboratories strive for the same state of the art in equipment, organization etc. Contrastingly, firms seek their own identity, a distinctive position in a market, and unique competitive advantage. Thus, while laboratories converge to a common standard, firms are striving for distinctiveness. Thus, we think, before transferred to a management context, the mechanisms described by Latour for “big science” must be carefully translated.

Key Finding 3: Dichotomies, Dualities, Dualisms, and Latour’s Janus
Research is frequently confronted with the question of how to conceptualize the relationship between two seemingly contradictory and incommensurable perspectives. Most often, they are conceptualized as dichotomies. Others like, for example, Giddens use the concept of duality. Latour uses the two-headed Janus to introduce distinctive and irreconcilable perspectives. The two faces of Janus talk at once and they say entirely different things. In one case, for example, Janus talks on the left side like a realist and one the right side like a relativist. In another case, the two faces represent a “science in action” vs. “ready made science” perspective. Latour introduces these distinctions not to later subscribe to one of the perspectives offered. Rather, he tries to reconcile them. Consequently, new types of research questions arise. Instead of, for example, the traditional questions of whether reality really exists out there or whether reality is just the result of our doing, Latour is much more concerned with the question of how actors actually live, utilize, and constantly switch between these different perspectives.

Literature:
Latour, B. 1987. Science in Action - How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society. Harvard University Press.